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TITLE II - ONE YEAR LATER:t

A LEGISLATIVE MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM
By C. S. MCCLELLAND

*

"Nothing can come out of nothing

. . ."

:

N THE race for space, the legislative branch of the Government launched
its own missile last August. The missile had at least one distinction. It
was itself nothing; it was hurled into nothingness. Launched in the heat of
summer, the contraptions used to fire it have all the earmarks of being contrived by harassed staff members and bureaucrats after a horrifying nightmare
in which they sought to extricate themselves from a comedy of errors that
dated at least as far back as July 1, 1953, and which threatened to ground the
projectile permanently. The missile which that midsummer night's dream proposed to launch was a dead Act which Congress later attempted to resurrect
by merely legislating a change in its expiration date after securing agreements from the executive agencies as to its use, without regard to the fact
that the Act placed the discretion as to its use in the incumbent President alone.
Accordingly, government contractors should realize that title II of the First
War Powers Act may be a snare and a delusion.
Those beneficiaries of the Act, who received public funds to which their
contracts do not entitle them, under well established principles of contract
law, have no reassurance by last summer's legislative performance that the
Government may not eventually compel them to refund the amounts involved,
by set-off or otherwise; since the Government is obligated to collect public
funds paid out in contravention of law. Those contractors who have not received such funds have no assurance that they were not equally entitled to
receive them, because Congress has never required the executive agencies to
prove to its satisfaction that the standards they apply in exercising the powers
under the Act are sufficiently definite and relevant to assure all contractors of
uniform treatment, uninfluenced by the whims and caprices of those who administer the Act.
t Editor's Note: The Administration of Title II of the First War Powers Act, 62 DICK. L.
REv. (March 1957), was an extensive evaluation and criticism of the topic. The present article
is a sequel thereto, less narrow in scope, .but illuminated by the happenings and events of the
past year.
* Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia and of the Supreme Court of the United
States; A.B., M.A., LL.B., George Washington University.
: Marcus Aurelius Antonius, Meditations II, 17.
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To the extent that the Act purports to exist on the statute books as it has
since 1951, on the basis of last summer's attempted amendment of an expired
Act, contractors should be aware that the executive agencies have made a "side
agreement" with the Senate Judiciary Committee. The "agreement" excludes
the functioning of the President's discretion, on which the language of the
Act entirely predicates the right of those agencies to use the powers of the
Act, and commits them to use only certain powers of the Act. The Pentagon
has learned from an experience in 1950 that it needs only to waive a distress
flag, emblazoned with stars of so-called "hardship" contractors, to overcome
any hesitation by the Committee on extending the Act. The Judiciary Committee appears to have become so absorbed in its desire not "to visit hardship
upon those who contracted with the Government in good faith and in knowledge that this extraordinary authority was available," they overlooked the
fact that it added to the hardship of those contractors by allowing an amendment purportedly reinstating on the statute books an expired Act which as
reinstated does not authorize what it expressly states and therefore misleads
any contractor who reads it without knowledge of its legislative history.
On September 7, 1957, approval was given to an Act which merely provides: "That section 2 of the Act of January 12, 1951 (64 Stat. 1257), as
amended, is further amended by striking out '1957' and inserting in lieu thereof '1958'." 1 However, the Act of January 12, 1951, was not in existence on
September 7, 1957. Nevertheless, by a mere change in the year designation,
the Act of September 7, 1957, purports to reactivate as well as amend a law
which no longer existed as a functioning statute, by reason of its expiration
two months before. The extension was predicated on agreements as to its
use, not with the President in whom the Act vests sole discretion as to its use
but with executive agencies to whom it is said the authority of the Act has been
delegated. But the Act does not permit such delegation and the incumbent
President has never authorized any of the executive agencies to exercise any
of the powers under the Act, much less delegated his authority to such agencies.
Approximately one year ago, in an article published in this law review,'
the writer discussed certain deficiencies in the administration of title II of the
First War Powers Act. The article referred to the fact that it seems to have
become almost commonplace to expect that each year, without any consideration or presentation of the facts concerning the administration of many of the
unprecedented powers granted by the Act, Congress will extend the Act as
"unduly automatically" (as a Defense Department official has described that
171 Stat. 628, 50 U.S.C. App. 611 (1952).
261 DICK. L. REV. 215 (1957).
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Department's policy) granting progress payments.' In June 1957, both Houses
of Congress appeared to be in agreement with the writer. For the first time
in all of the years in which it has been extended, when the bill to extend the
Act (H. R. 7536) was presented on the floor of the House of Representatives,
it was stated to be the opinion of a majority of the committee "that emergency
legislation such as this should not be automatically extended for long periods
of time without sufficient study and understanding by the committee." ' Accordingly, on June 30, 1957, the Act was allowed to lapse, although the House
bill to extend passed the House on June 17, 1957.
The reported reason for allowing it to lapse was "because Senators want
to investigate the operation of the law." ' It was further reported that several
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee were so concerned with the matter
that they would probably press for public hearings, the main purpose of which
would be to determine whether the Act should continue year after year, and
whether its administration has been costly to the Government or in any way
unfair to private contractors. The report expressed doubt that such hearings
would be held or any committee action taken in time for Senate action on an
extension of the bill in 1957. However, committee members were reported
to believe that no damage would be done if the extension was not approved
in the near future since "adequate moves could be made by the President
under other emergency powers if specific need developed." ' The same report
quoted a member of the House Judiciary Committee as stating that most members "feel emergency legislation such as this should not be extended for long
periods of time without sufficient study and understanding." 7
Later, in August 1957, the Senate Judiciary Committee also for the first
time in the long history of the Act, proceeded "to put on notice those who
contract with the Government in the future that this authority is no longer to be
automatically extended during periods in which the United States is not engaged in armed conflict." 8 Nevertheless, no hearings were conducted by
either House of Congress, and notwithstanding its expressed conviction that
when the United States is not engaged in war, the extraordinary powers of
the Act should not be extended, except upon a detailed showing of necessity,
the Senate Judiciary Committee eventually capitulated to the same argument
that was so vigorously and successfully advanced seven years earlier in an
31d. at 219, f.n. 16.
4 103 Cong. Rec. 8396-8397 (June 17, 1957).
5The Evening Star, Washington, D. C., August 1, 1957, sect. B, p. 10.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8
S. Rep. No. 1152, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1957).
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attempt to secure the continuation of the powers? The military departments
informed the committee that a total of 184 applications were pending on June
30, 1957, claiming $20,917,739 for amendments without consideration; corrections of mistakes; and formalizations of oral agreements previously made.
The committee also reported the receipt of numerous communications from
individuals representing corporations which had claims pending as of June 30,
1957, when Congeess allowed the Act to expire. It therefore appeared to the
Committee that insofar as those who had claims pending at the time of the
expiration of the Act, further processing of their claims could not be effected
and a considerable hardship could thereby ensue. The Committee report
stated that it:
...has no desire to visit hardship upon those who contracted with the
Government in good faith and in the knowledge that this extraordinary authority was available to certain departments of Government should difficulties
be encountered during the period of the performance of the contract. 10
At the same time, the Committee said it was reluctant to agree to further extension of the authority without adequate examination into its operation and
the specific necessity for each of the powers granted. At the direction of the
Committee, the Chairman addressed a letter "to each of the departments to
whom this authority has been delegated," requesting their agreement to apply
the authority only with respect to contracts entered into on or before June 30,
1957, and to use only certain powers under the Act. The departments were
fairly responsive to the request of the Committee, but for obvious reasons.
They had everything to gain and nothing to lose, in the event the action of
Congress actually extended the Act.
The Senate Judiciary report appears in error in speaking of "the departments to whom this authority has been delegated." The authority under the
Act is the President's and it is to authorize certain departments and agencies,
both referred to in this article as executive agencies, to exercise the powers
described in the Act, whenever the President deems such action will facilitate
the national defense. The Act contains no language allowing the President
to delegate that authority. On the contrary, delegation of the President's
authority to the executive agencies appears precluded 'by the express language
of the Act and by its legislative history." There is no record that the in9 Hearings before the Senate Committee on Expenditures in
S. 4266. To Amend and Extend Title II of the First War Powers
President, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 27-30 (1950).
10 S. Rep. No. 1152, 85th Cong., 1st, 3 (1957).
11 Hearings before the Senate Committee on Expenditures in
S. 4266, To Amend and Extend Title 11 of the First War Powers
President, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 33-35 (1950).

the Executive Departments, on
Act, Emergency Powers of the
the Executive Departments, on
Act, Emergency Powers of the
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cumbent President since January 20, 1953, has ever attempted to delegate
his authority under the Act to any executive agency or that he has ever authorized any of the agencies to take any of the actions described in the Act.
The Senate Judiciary Committee overlooks the fact that the President has
failed to take the very action which it has said he must take to make the Act
function for the executive agencies. This fact also is ignored by the executive agencies, which, since Mr. Eisenhower was inaugurated in January 1953,
have for over five years been citing a determination by Mr. Truman in February 1951, that the actions permitted by the Act were necessary to facilitate the
national defense. Five years seems a rather long time to allow a determination by a President no longer in office to govern the use of powers once described as "practically upsetting the law of contracts" 12 and considered by
Congress as so extraordinary and unprecedented as to require its annual reconsideration. In allowing the agencies to use powers granted to them by
Mr. Truman, pursuant to his determination, years after Mr. Truman is no
longer in office, is to ignore the discretion which Congress designedly restricted
to the chief executive with respect to determining when the use of the powers
of the Act is necessary.
Last summer, despite its earlier expressions of concern, the Senate Judiciary Committee, as in prior extensions of the Act, appears to have treated
Mr. Truman's executive orders as something permanently attached to the Act
itself, even though it had expired on June 30, 1957. Thus, by relying on
Mr. Truman's determination years ago when the Act was in existence, the
committee could exercise the discretion of President Eisenhower, as well as
its own, in determining whether the use of the powers involved was still necessary to facilitate the national defense. If the Committee's action was not an
exercise of the discretion of the President, it would appear that the Committee
treated Mr. Truman's determination as sufficient to constitute an exercise of
the discretion which President Eisenhower is required to perform under the
Act. Also, in last summer's action on the matter, as in previous years, there is
no record to indicate that either House of Congress requested those who used
the powers of the Act and sought their continuation, to state their authority
for using them without the authorization of the incumbent President and
without his determination that such use was necessary to facilitate the national
defense, as required by the Act.
In entering into "agreements" in August 1957 with respect to the use
of the Act until June 30, 1958, Congress, instead of seeking an accord with
12 Hearings ibefore Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, on H. R.
5944 and S. 2421, to Amend the Act of January 12, 1951, Amending and Extending Title II of
the First War Powers Act, 1941, Serial No. 18, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1952).
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Mr. Eisenhower (to whom Congress gave the authority and the sole discretion
under the Act), ignored him as well as the plain language of the Act, and
bargained with the executive agencies which, without authorization to use the
Act were incompetent as contracting parties on the matter and had nothing
to offer, and none of which have any authorization to use the powers of the
Act unless and until Mr. Eisenhower determines such authorization will facilitate the national defense and for that reason grants the authorization.
Since Mr. Eisenhower has never made the authority, or the powers, of
the Act available to any of the executive agencies, there appears to be no basis
for the reference in the Senate Judiciary report to those who contracted "in
good faith and knowledge that this extraordinary authority was 1 available
to certain departments ... should difficulties be encountered during the period
of the performance of the contract." 1" Moreover, even if such authority
could be said to be available, no contractor would 'be justified in assuming, as
the Senate report infers, that the powers of the Act could be exercised "during the period of the performance of the contract," if the performance period
extended beyond June 30, 1957, or if, prior to that date, there had 'been no
determination that performance of the contract would facilitate the national
defense. Any difficulties which contractors might encounter in such performance, as suggested by the Senate report, would not entitle them to any
relief under the Act unless such relief would facilitate the national defense.
Nevertheless, the available evidence shows that the administrative standards
used to determine entitlement to such relief are not sufficiently well defined
to avoid arbitrary and capricious evaluation of a contractor's right to relief "5
and Congress has never required the agencies to jusify their extensive use of
the Act or to file a comprehensive report of the standards used in specific
cases. Instead it appears to accept, as conclusive of entitlement to relief under
title II of the Act, any "hardship" report which the Defense Department relates, and thereupon extends the Act for another year.
There is no indication that the judiciary Committee required the Defense
Department to allow Committee staff members to evaluate the merits of some
of those 184 applications for relief, which the Department reported as pending
in August 1957 and apparently pressed as a persuasive argument for the customary extention of the Act, without a thorough consideration of the justification for it. In the rush for adjournment at the time, the Committee appears
to have made no more of an attempt to compel the Defense Department to
present sound reasons for the extension of the Act than Congress required in
13

See note 10, supra.

14

Ibid.

25 61 DICK. L. REv. 215, 250-252 (1957).
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1950 when a similar "hard luck" story was advanced to obtain an extension of
the Act.16
In 1950, the Defense Department reported that there were 45 "distress"
contracts in the Army alone and the involved contractors were facing possible
bankruptcy because fixed prices in such contracts were "entirely inadequate to
meet increased costs." 17 The Department reported that unless Congress took
immediate action many of those sources of supply would be denied the Government, and, in certain cases, contract price adjustments were said to be essential to keep the firms in production and to avoid bankruptcy. The main
object was explained not to be prevention of losses on Government contracts
because of increased costs (except in extreme hardship cases), but to afford
relief to small business firms which might otherwise be prevented from completing deliveries on such contracts due to increased costs. 8 But the Act does
not offer relief on such facts in the absence of a determination that such relief
would facilitate the national defense. No record has been found that the
Defense Department was ever required to furnish Congress a report which
would specifically identify the 45 contractors involved 19 and such description
of the standards used as would disclose whether relief was granted, or refused,
on the basis of definite and relevant factors clearly within the contemplation
of the Act.
So long as Congress permits the powers of the Act to be used without
regard to the standards applied, or allows the use of indefinite and irrelevant
standards in determining whether relief under the Act will facilitate the national defense, contractors seeking relief under the Act will be subject to the
whims and caprices of those who administer the Act and the taxpayer will
have no assurance that public funds are properly protected. Facilitation of the
national defense was the standard set by Congress itself and it was Congress
which said the standard shall be applied by the President. If Congress continues to encourage and upholds the executive agencies in ignoring that
standard and the requirement that it be applied by the President, periodic expressions of Congressional concern over the failure of the executive agencies
to administer the laws as intended by Congress appear irreconcilable, to say
16 See note 9, supra.

17S. Rep. No. 2686, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1957).
18 Ibid.
19 If they were not contractors whose products or services could not be obtained elsewhere,
their "rescue" to facilitate the national defense seems unwarranted. This is not to say that they
might not have been entitled to some form of relief from the Government. But the Senate report
on why the 45 contractors should be entitled to relief under the First War Powers Act appears as
vague as the standards used 'by the agencies who administer the Act.
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the least. With so little observance of the language of the Act, and so much
relief granted without regard to what the Act requires to afford relief, it is
not difficult to understand why there is great pressure each year to perpetuate
the Act.

